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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2010, the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile established joint operational military structures as
part of a more general reform of national security and
defense institutions. While it is too soon to assess the impact
of these institutional innovations, we can benefit from a
quick overview of some of the main points of the successful
U.S. effort at “jointness”1 in the Goldwater – Nichols
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (G-N). Based on the
experience of the U.S., the author is not sanguine that the
formal move of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to joint
structures will soon result in an improvement in their joint
military behavior. The U.S. Government and the United
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in particular,
can increase the chances of these joint structures becoming
effective by orienting attention and resources to them and to
the ministries of defense (MOD), which has inspired them,
and not to the individual services. While Colombia has not
mandated joint structures at the national level, it has
established joint regional commands that most observers
believe have proven effective in fighting the Fuerzas
Revolucionaries
de
Colombia
(FARC).
Armadas
USSOUTHCOM can continue to support these regional joint
commands, while also seeking to influence reform at the
national level of the MOD and a strengthening of the joint
staff. In this paper the author looks at the new joint
structures in the three Southern Cone countries and to the
regional commands in Colombia.

1

Here “jointness” means the different U.S. armed forces being able to
operate together. It became possible, in my view, because of the
requirement for officers from the different services to be educated jointly
and in joint matters, and also service in joint billets.

1

PRIOR (TO 2010) MILITARY STRUCTURES AT THE
NATIONAL LEVEL
Prior to the 2010 reforms, the military structures of
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, at the national level, did not
allocate much power to the Minister of Defense (MOD).
There was also very little “jointness”, and much overlapping
and redundancy in responsibilities. Figures 1-4 represent the
past command structures of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and
the current command structure of Colombia.
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Figure 1: Former Legal Framework and Defense Structure
for Argentina

Source: “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and
Caribbean”, (RESDAL, 2010)

Figure 2: Former Legal Framework and Defense Structure for
Brazil

Source: “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and
Caribbean,”( RESDAL, 2010)
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Figure 3: Former Legal Framework and Defense Structure for
Chile

Source: “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and
Caribbean,” (RESDAL, 2010)

Figure 4: Current Legal Framework and Defense Structure
for Colombia

Source: “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and
Caribbean,” (RESDAL, 2010)
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There are three important similarities in the three Southern
Cone countries (Argentina, Chile and Brazil). First, it took a
very long time for the reforms to be passed into law from the
beginning of the transitions. In Argentina, the transition
began in 1983; in Brazil, in 1985; and Chile, in1990.
Second, the laws that were finally passed, were part of a
more comprehensive reform seeking to strengthen the
MODs, and thus created the joint structures. And third,
either directly, through explicit pressure, or indirectly
through exposure in U.S. programs in-country or in the U.S.,
the reforms in terms of joint structures were inspired by the
U.S. experience with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (GN). Although not officially
documented, there may possibly be links to the three
countries have peacekeeping forces in Haiti, motivating
international interoperability and compatibility as a factor for
jointness.
In Argentina, although the Law on National Defense had
been passed in 1988, it was never implemented. President
Nestor Kirchner (2003 – 2007) saw to its implementation in
June of 2006 in Law 727/ 2006. This law strengthened the
civilian – led ministry of defense, established the powers of
the joint staff and took power away from the chiefs of the
services.
In the strengthened MOD itself, there are major accretions in
the responsibilities in several critical areas of the
organization.
These tend to follow closely to those
suggested by Bruneau & Goetze in their work on roles and
functions of ministries of defense. (Bruneau & Tollefson,
2006). In Law 727/2006, the armed forces‟ mission is limited
to external defense and specifically against state actors. Also
directivas (1691/ 2006; & 1714/2009) following on Law
727/2006, circumscribed the roles and missions of the armed
forces. The distinction is made between defense, which is the
responsibility of the armed forces, and security, which is the
5

responsibility of the Secretariat for Domestic Security that is
under the Ministry of Interior. (It should be noted there is a
new, cabinet-level, ministry dealing with internal security the
ex-MOD.
Nilda Garre, now heads that ministry.)
Consequently, the Armed Forces cannot deal with the socalled new threats including terrorism, counter- drugs, and
organized crime; what the Armed Forces can do is external
peace-keeping missions. This is believed to be a positive
area in the overall fairly bleak panorama of the Argentine
Armed Forces.
While the laws were passed in 2006, implementing the law
of 1988, it was only in December of 2010 that a Commander
of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces was appointed; and, in
Resolution 1633/2010, the structures of the joint staff
specified. Appendix I presents the Boletín Oficial (Official
Gazette) concerning these developments. In short, there is
now a joint staff in Argentina, but with the very limited roles
and budget (less than 1% of GDP), of the Armed Forces.
However, there is a real question regarding the significance
of this structural change.
In Brazil, Lei Complementar No 136 of 25 August 2010
elaborated on the roles of the MOD and created the EstadoMaior Conjunto das Forcas Armadas. It must be noted that
the MOD was created only in 1999. Until then, there were
six general or flag officers in the cabinet. Figures 5 and 6
present the Brazilian defense structures before and after the
law No 136. All observers agree that Nelson Jobim (July
2007 – present) is the first powerful MOD, and he was able
to have a package of laws passed by the Congress in 2010,
arguing that these issues were all internal to the MOD.
Appendix II presents an overview of these laws. There were
four components to the laws, which provided for an overall
updating of roles, missions, and structures. The main
question now is whether the joint structure will work since,
as can be seen in Figure 6, all of the officers at the top levels
6

are four -star, and their positions mirrors to some degree the
continuing structure of the three services.
In Chile, although there has been a MOD since 1932, it
began to change significantly with the democratic transition
in 1990. There was, however, no law on its functioning until
2010. (See Appendix III for the law.) The Law led to the
creation of a series of new structures within the MOD.
Figures 7 and 8 present the Chilean defense structure before
and after the transition in 2010. First, a single Undersecretary
of Defense was created by combining the already existing,
yet redundant, three departments of the armed forces [for
War (or Army), Navy, and Air Forces], which were focused
on rather administrative duties for each institution. Second,
a Joint Chiefs of Staff was created, which had an operational
function related to the joint preparation and utilization of the
Armed Forces. It also commands and conducts operations at
the strategic level (including international crises
management operations, and external wars). Third, a new
Undersecretary for Defense Policy Office was created
(which was supposed to be staffed with civilian subject
matter experts) to develop defense and military policy and
conduct the main defense planning (e.g. war plans, joint
planning).
In both of these reforms, the competencies of the ministers of
defense were increased; and new structures to promote
“jointness” in the Armed Forces created, as can be seen from
the more detailed before and after descriptions for first Brazil
and then Chile.
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Figure 5: Brazil Defense Structure before the Law of 25 August 2010

Figure 6: Brazil detailed defense Structure after the Decree Law of
25 August 2010 (above).
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Figure 7: Detailed Chilean Defense Structure before the Law of 2010
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Figure 8: Detailed Chilean Defense Structure after the Law of 2010
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It must be understood that the trend, (in at least these three
countries of Argentina, Chile and Brazil), towards joint
military command structures is part of a reform in civil–
military relations. This is in terms of not only consolidating
democratic civilian control but also in increasing military
effectiveness. In all three countries, the apparent changes
towards more joint structures are part and parcel of a reform
in which the powers of the minister of defense are
specifically increased. The question remains, however,
whether there are sufficient civilians, with stability in their
positions and expertise, to be able to implement these new
structures, and to force independent services to cooperate
and operate jointly.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF MORE JOINTNESS: LESSONS
FROM GOLDWATER – NICHOLS (G-N)
There is a double relevance for analyzing the current Latin
American efforts at establishing new joint command
structures of the U.S. experience at achieving “jointness”.
First, as noted at the beginning of this report, either
explicitly, through pressures on civilian officials and military
officers in the region, or implicitly though readings and
courses attended by these same officials and officers, U.S.
officials and officers have emphasized the importance of
“jointness”. Second, a real (versus shallow) understanding
of the U.S. experience can allow us to better evaluate the
likelihood of these new, formal structures taking on meaning
and content.
As stated in the Introduction to “Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era” states
(CSIS Report, March 2004, p. 12):
“In the mid-1980s, a series of operational military failures in
the field – the botched attempt to rescue the American
hostages in Iran, the Beirut embassy bombing and the
10

interoperability problems during the invasion of Grenada –
convinced Congress that the Department of Defense was
broken and that something had to be done. Despite intense
resistance from DoD, over four years of Congressional
hearings, investigation, and analysis finally culminated in the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) – a landmark of U.S.
defense reform.”
There are four points that should be emphasized regarding
G-N and its relevance for “jointness” in these three
countries. (See the references to Barrett, Locher, and Roman
& Tarr). First, there had long been a deep awareness in the
U.S. of the institutional impediments to the combat
effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces. It required,
however, several operational failures to galvanize support for
the major reforms embodied in G-N. Second, the success of
G-N, that was the last major reform of U.S. national security
and defense (although there have been 21 largely
unsuccessful efforts between 1986 and 2008) was a
bipartisan effort. Third, as the U.S. executive (mainly the
Department of Defense) would not take the initiative in
institutional reform, it was the U.S. Congress that finally
took the initiative and passed the reform, over the opposition
of Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of the Navy
Lehman, and virtually all of the uniformed heads of the
services. While there were many reasons for resistance to the
changes included in G-N, the main opposition was due to
perceived loss of autonomy for the services, and for
Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the perception that the
reforms were a criticism of his stewardship of DoD. And,
fourth, G-N is based on incentives; if an officer aspires to
become an O-7, he or she must do JPME and serve in joint
billets. The authors of the G-N law specifically based their
strategy for its implementation in the services on incentives.
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In Argentina, Brazil and Chile none of these key drivers for
reform, resulting in “jointness” in the U.S., apply. First, in
virtually all of the reforms, which focus first on the MOD
and then on the joint staff, the emphasis is on asserting
civilian control and not achieving effectiveness. Here
effectiveness means the ability for the forces to in fact
implement the roles and missions they are entrusted with.
Second, as none of the armed forces in these three countries
are engaged in combat, there can be none of the catalytic
effects arising from operational disasters which
demonstrated again and again in the former U.S. system.
Third, none of the Latin American congresses have anything
like the power and sense of power that the U.S. Congress
embodies and exercises. If the model of reform in Latin
America, as in the U.S. is G-N, then it appears very unlikely
that “jointness” will catch on. And fourth, none of the
MODs or joint staffs in South America gives any indication
of the use of incentives, or disincentives, to promote the
support of officers of joint structures and processes.
In Colombia, it is interesting to note that Figure 9 (also
included in Appendix IV) does not even include the MOD in
the Command Structure. Despite U.S. efforts in the early
period of the presidency of Alvaro Uribe (2002 – 2010),
there was minimal reform of the MOD. As the then Minister
Marta Lucia Ramirez remarked, “There is a civilian minister
of defense but not a civilian ministry of defense.” The
phenomenon of joint commands is separate, unlike
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, from MOD reform. The
stimulus for “jointness” arises from the need to fight the
FARC, and other illegal armed groups.
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Figure 9: Detailed Current Command Structure of Colombia at the
Level of the Armed Forces

In the late 1990's to early 2000's, the establishment of area
joint commands started (Joint Task Force South and Joint
Task Force Caribbean). These early attempts lacked real
control over units. The next iteration was to transform Joint
Task Force South to the now Task Force Omega. The
difference was that Task Force Omega had units
permanently assigned to it from most of the forces. They
were given the authority and the resources for mobility to
move anywhere tactically needed. This reorganization
proved very successful because the military was no longer
constrained by operational area boards, which the FARC
took advantage of to escape pursuing military units. The
combination of service capabilities into one planning group
also facilitated intelligence, logistical and combat support
efforts. (See Porch, 2111).
Based on the success of Task Force Omega several other JTF
were created. The largest of which is Joint Task Force
Pacific 2009, to fight the FARC in the Pacific region. In
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2010, Gen. Freddy Padilla de Leon, Commander of the
Colombian Armed Forces, wanted to have a seminar with
general officers from all of the services to discuss the
success of Joint Commands in their effort against the FARC
and other illegal armed groups. All of the current, and some
of the former, JTF Commanders were present with the
services‟ Vice-Chiefs (later to become the current leaders).
The U.S. expectation for this conference was that the idea of
“jointness” showed benefits and utility for the war against
the illegal armed groups, and that the recommendation would
be to continue. Several comments in the open forum from the
general officers present were that there is no doubt that
“jointness” has helped; but how to replicate (quickly) the
success in the rest of the territory. They further suggested
that there was no room for service specific military districts,
as the Army is divided today. The ideas were that the entire
country should be divided into Joint Commands (COCOMS)
in which all military assets would belong to one
Commander. This would obviously facilitate combined
operations, and it would also focus all coordinated operations
with the Police. (At the time this report is being written no
published report on the seminar is available. See Estructura
Seminario presented in Appendix IV).
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